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PROGRESS AND REGRESS SYMETRY 
OF THE CROATIAN ECONOMY
Generally speaking the 20th century displayed turbulent growth per-
formance in Croatia. Contemporary developed countries have ended the 
century with many a time multiplied national output. The rest of the world 
encompassing dominant portion of world’s population and prevailing num-
ber of countries is still fi ghting uphill way through curving path of economic 
development, often exposed to many side-tracks and blind alleys. Growth pe-
riods when attained are immediately followed by periods of stagnation and/
or overall regress, with unsatisfactorily growth performance in the long run. 
Result is widening of the development gap between vast majority of world 
population and minority of “lucky” ones living in developed economies. In 
that context Croatian experience is not only intriguing but also analytically 
very distinctive.
Key words: economic progress, economic regress, growth, employment, 
infl ation, export to import ratio, fl uctuations, transition, privatization, stabi-
lization
1.1. Economic Fluctuation Dynamics in the 20th Century
In the 20th century Croatian GDP was 9 times multiplied. At the same time 
the population grew only 1.4 times, so the GDP per capita rose almost 8 times. 
Average annual GDP growth rate of 2,19% throughout century accompanied by 
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the annual GDP per capita growth rate of 1,85% are considered as relatively high, 
for growth rates above 1,5% annually are globally considered successful. 
But these trends should be confronted with more detailed growth rate analy-
sis and with the other macroeconomic variables behavior. Analyzing annual GDP 
rates it becomes clear that economic activity has been highly unstable over the 
years. This instability can be seen in range of extreme values, but also in growth 
rates volatility (Družić/Tica, 2003:94). 
In the period of crisis, for example in 1932 growth rate was negative, -9%. 
Wars and natural disasters emphasize extreme values dropping the negative growth 
rates to over -20%. It should be stressed that non-economic constraints between 
World Wars I and II had been signifi cantly and mainly unfavorably infl uencing 
Croatian economic development, especially in the 1930s (Bićanić, 2004: 238). 
Positive extreme values are a bit lower than 20%, and are mostly result of a 
leap in growth rates in periods of reconstruction of the economy, as in 1947 when 
the growth rate was more than 19%. Very high annual growth rate could also 
originate from the recovery boost after previous year dawn fall, such case being 
1956/57. After negative rate of -4.2% in 1956, follows increase of almost 19% in 
1957. 
The annual oscillations are noticeable in all periods. In the 1960s that are 
usually defi ned as period of expansion, growth rates were 7%, 2%, 10% and 3%. 
The persistent appearance of extreme values and annual oscillations show deep 
structural Croatian economy problems, partly caused by the frequent changes in 
institutional and social framework, as well as in economic system itself. The only 
stable behavior shows birth rate continuously decreasing through the most of the 
20th century (Gelo/Akrap/Čipin, 2005:39). This “stable” population “growth” is 
the reason for the relatively small variations between GDP and per capita GDP 
growth rates. (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1 
GDP AND GDP PER CAPITA IN CROATIA
Source: Družić, I. (2005) “A Journey Through Transition Time – With Special Reference to 
Croatia” Political Culture, Zagreb pp. 285-296.
1.2. Economic Progress and Regress Symmetry 
Analysis structured in this way gives somewhat different insight in the long-
run performance of the Croatian economy (Družić, 2004:192). Standard economic 
analysis suggests the conclusion that economies capable of tearing away from 
the stationary agrarian environment and apt to launch themselves into the indu-
strialization, trade expansion and market institutionalization orbit, achieve (with 
temporary oscillations) continuous economic progress as a rule.
Developed Western economies continuous growth experience in the last 200-
250 years, marked by signifi cant overall economic progress, considerable average 
life-expectancy increase, national income growth and living standards accretion, 
could be deemed as the empirical confi rmation of such a notion, despite occasio-
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Available data instruct that Croatian economy performance could be comfor-
tably fi tted into the Western economies mainstream events. However, if the last 
century is divided into shorter spans, then the picture showing continuous progress 
of the Croatian economy in the last 100 years is becoming somewhat blurred. 
Even more, when zero growth rates during the two recession decades are added to 
the negative growth rates during the three war decades, then the twentieth century 
could be divided into the two almost equal time segments. 
In the 50 years of ˝peace˝ comprising of the fi rst and the third decade, and 
especially period from 1950-1980, Croatia experienced in the world relations an 
impressive growth obtaining the status of the middle developed industrial country 
with the average annual rate of growth close to 7%. Neglected fact of relatively 
successful Croatian start into the twentieth century should be also pointed out.
In the fi rst decade (1900-1910), Croatia, as a part of Austrian Empire, ste-
ps forward into industrialization period achieving relatively high average annual 
rates of growth of more than 3%. Successful growth at the beginning of the 20th 
century hasn’t been subjected to deeper research so far. Mindful attention to this 
period could point out the impact of the “spin off” industrialization of Croatia at 
the margin of the once great empire. Economic development was mostly based on 
the non-fi nancial sectors growth that some scholars are apt to defi ne as the “real” 
growth as opposed to the so called “jobless” growth dominantly leaning on fi nan-
cial sector “bubbling”.
In the third decade (1920-1930), Croatia followed the post-war trend of eco-
nomic expansion reaching the average annual growth rates slightly over 4%.  La-
ter events showed that the growth was mostly based on the fi nancial sector expan-
sion, as confi rmed with the width and depth of the 1930-ies great depression. 
Finally, in the three decades from 1950-1980, Croatia experienced an accele-
rated growth with average annual growth rates fl uctuating in the wide range from 
4% to 11% in certain years. Despite of particular structural and stability problems 
which were induced in this period and surfaced later on, it can be stated this period 
is the most successful continuous growth period in the twentieth century.
In the remaining “troubling” 50 years, encompassing second, most part of 
the fourth, fi fth, ninth and the last decade of the 20th century, Croatia was expe-
riencing negative and/or zero average annual growth rates. At the end of the cen-
tury Croatia was facing a phenomenon, unknown till that time – the deindustria-
lization, accompanied with average negative growth rate that amounted -0.77% 
during this fi fty years. 
It seems that scholars have failed to take into proper consideration the three 
wars impact on the level of economic activity and the Croatian development chan-
ces. 
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Preparations for the World War I (1914 – 1918), the War itself and its con-
sequences had impact on the whole decade from 1910 till 1920. As a result, the 
level of Gross Domestic Product was lower in 1920 than in pre-war 1913 (Vinski, 
1967:163). Development wise it was a decade of regress instead of progress. 
The events in period from 1940 – 1950 were very much affected by the Wor-
ld War II, that had dramatic consequences and resulted in extremely high human 
and property losses. These events had a large impact on the economic trends in 
the decade. Standard interpretations imply that the level of key macroeconomic 
indicators from pre-war 1939 was reached in the period of 1945-47 reconstruc-
tion. More detailed researches have shown that, on one hand, the level of GDP 
was lower in 1950 than in 1940, while, on the other hand, the GDP per capita 
was higher in 1950, due to the immense loss of lives in the World War II that was 
extraordinary cruel on the Croatian soil (Stipetić, 2002). However, the above men-
tioned explanation does not undermine the importance of the fact that in 1940-
1950 decade Croatian economy experienced regress instead of progress.
The economic events in the period from 1990 to 2000 were prevalently ruled 
by the Homeland War in Croatia (1991-1995). After high human losses, deva-
station of utilities and industrial capacities, cultural heritage destruction, Croatia 
fi nally gained independency and became a sovereign state member of the inter-
national community. War losses, followed by visibly high costs of transformation 
from planned to market economy decimated development capacity and for the 
third time in one century expanded the average annual negative growth rates to 
the entire decade (Družić, 1999:1640). Still it should be mentioned that there are 
enough arguments supporting notion that not reaching the pre-transition GDP le-
vel after 10 years (it took 16 years to 2006 to reach the pre transition level) could 
not be ascribed to war and its consequences solely. Deep economic and social 
deformations caused by economically ineffi cient and socially unacceptable pri-
vatization model and by prolonged stabilization program needlessly lasting for 
over ten years are also responsible for the suboptimal performance of the Croatian 
economy in the transition decade of 1990s. Continuous and rigid stabilization 
model has been blamed to needlessly deepen recession by prolonged hard budget 
constraints and especially by unchangeable fi xed national currency exchange rate 
undermining export oriented growth (Veselica/Vojnić, 2001:1204).
The events symmetry is also contributed by the fact that two economic crisis 
added to the uneven Croatian economical growth. The Great Depression of 1930”s 
resulted in negative, i.e. zero growth rates, especially in the fi rst half of this deca-
de, and so the GDP level from 1929 wasn’t reached until 1936. The 1980’s reces-
sion resulted in zero (and by some fi ndings, slightly negative) growth rates in the 
fi rst and negative growth rates in the second half of that decade.
The important fi ndings could be derived from comparative overview of 
growth and infl ation rates. In opposition to the well known theories professed by 
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signifi cant number of professional economists that high positive growth rates lose 
their effect in attending high infl ation and instability, long-run Croatian economic 
trends do not confi rm the existence of the trade off between growth and infl ation 
rates. High growth rates from 1950 to 1980 were followed by relatively frugal and 
bearable annual infl ation rates of 13%. As opposed to that, in periods of recession 
in 1980”s and the crisis in 1990”s with average annual negative growth rates of 
–0.79% and –1.48%, average annual infl ation rate expands to over 100%.
This long run development perspective has shed a different light on the cen-
tennial Croatian economic performance. It gives a reason for the not so pleasant 
cognition that in Croatian case economic regress is almost as legitimate as pro-
gress. This impression is supported by international comparison data that empha-
size periods when Croatian growth performance had been congruent as opposed to 
the periods when it had been contrary to the civilized world development trends. 
2. Industrialization and transition 1951-2000
Findings and ideas that could come by observing the centennial trends may 
be of remarkable assistance in Croatian economy realistic calibration of deve-
lopment chances at the beginning of third millennium. But that’s just the most 
general insight into development capacity and therefore not reliable enough for 
sound estimate. 
To help us out modern economic analysis, that has been developing after 
The World War II, follows macroeconomic performances of national economy by 
defi ning and resolving four main macroeconomic variables:
- level and dynamic of national product, 
- employment/unemployment, 
- price level/infl ation 
- national currency exchange rate/balance of payments. 
National and international statistics started to gather necessary data mostly 
in the second part of the 20th century corresponding with the appearance of ma-
croeconomics as an autonomous discipline.
Concentration on these four pointed out macro variables doesn’t eliminate 
the necessity of the analysis of other indicators describing the level and quality 
of business activity, living standard improvements, consumption, durable goods 
stocks, energy intensity and traffi c effi ciency, external economies impact etc. Ne-
vertheless, the appropriate importance of those partial analysis couldn’t come to 
full existence without appropriate support of the key macro variables long term 
behavior analysis. 
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In search for the relevant time frame that would enable most continuous 
observation of the mentioned macroeconomic variables, we have to lean against 
the period after the World War II, in other terms, second half of the 20th century 
in which statistical data gathering was enlarging and macroeconomic analytical 
frame was developing. Global trends analysis based on conceptual and metho-
dological improvements in this period reported relatively dynamic development, 
with diminishing intensity to the end of the century.
2.1. Economic development and growth costs 1950-2000
Better part of the period between the end of the World War II and Croatian 
independence achieved in 1990 was marked by “late” industrialization that had 
accelerating effect on the economic growth. Croatia, similar to other eastern Eu-
ropean economies, started forced industrialization with noticeable historical time 
lag as compared to developed west-European economies. 
Industrial revolution gaining its full swing at the beginning of the 19th centu-
ry, made possible industrialization of the modern developed Western economies 
in the span of 70 to 100 years during 19th century up until the start of the WW I. 
Despite differences concerning the beginning of the accelerated industrialization 
(England started at the end of the 18th century and Japan and Germany at the mid-
dle of the 19th century) all those countries entered the 20th century as industrialized 
nations.
Croatia entered the industrialization process that initiated its accelerated 
growth as a “late comer” being late for more than one century. Standard approach 
would suggest that because Croatia, in different governing systems, became a part 
of a modern economic development as a late comer, it was possible by passing 
existing experiences and development “spill over”, to accelerate its own growth. 
By mostly using its resources for industrial development Croatia succeeded doing 
in 30-40 years what took developed countries 70-90 years to do. Measuring by the 
key macroeconomic indicators in the mid 1970s Croatia became middle develo-
ped industrial country.
Controversial economic events in the afore transition period, especially in 
the light of transition recession during 1990s begot equally controversial profes-
sional discussion and adverse estimates concerning (un)successfulness of econo-
mic development in this period. Picking out most suitable periods and selecting 
certain indicators has rendered opportunity for diametrically opposite conclusions 
about development trends to be analytically valid.
Therefore, the best effort would be put out to establish analysis that will be 
founded on straightforward untempered empirical facts and their possible time 
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frame stratifi cations. It is hoped to be the more objective path to the unhindered 
insight into the real growth mechanics.
In the second half of the 20th century Croatian GDP increased from 4.3 bil-
lion US$  in the 1952 to 21.3 billion in the 2000 (in 1990. US$ ). That means that 
“real” GDP, by average annual growth rate of 3.38 % increased over 5 times. If 
the almost stationary population growth of 13.4% or 0.24 % annually in the same 
period is added, then the  respectable GDP per capita average annual growth rate 
of 3.13% resulting in more than 5 times increase could be observed in that period 
(see Figure 2.).
Figure 2
CROATIAN GDP AND GDP PER CAPITA 1952-2000
Source: Družić, I. (2005) “A Journey Through Transition Time – With Special Reference to 
Croatia” Political Culture, Zagreb pp. 285-296.
In this half century period employment grew from 477 thousand in 1951 to 
1.185 million in 2000, or for about 2.5 times. In the combination with the GDP 
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US$. Simplifying thing considerably it could be stated that labor productivity in 
50 years doubled. 
Output and employment behavior in that period was followed by interesting 
behavior of the other two variables. 
Taking the export to import ratio as a proxy for the international trade the 
average annual ratio could be identifi ed at the 75 per cent, but the decreasing trend 
of the export to import ratio could be also identifi ed throughout the period after the 
World War II. In the 1950s it fl uctuated around the average of 80%, and at the end 
of the 1990s it fell to about 50%.
In the environment of relatively open Croatian economy, GDP growth ac-
companied by almost continuous fall of export to import ratio is a clear warning 
signal alarming of disrupted general equilibrium and growing structural dispro-
portions. When in a small and thus necessarily opened economy, thise direction 
of international trade relations starts to dominate, it indicates the competitiveness 
decrease resulting in diminishing infl ows in the BOP (balance of payments) and 
its defi cit increase, mostly covered by external debt growth. 
These BOP trends could be also viewed as the back side refl ecting domestic 
economy inner instability, its front face being infl ation. It is quite noticeable that 
infl ation, with average annual rate close to 50% during the 50 years, through seve-
ral denominations had continuously been increasing its tempo (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND INFLATION RATE IN CROATIA
Source: Družić, I. (2005) “A Journey Through Transition Time – With Special Reference to 
Croatia” Political Culture, Zagreb pp. 285-296.
In the 1950s, and all the way until 1963 there was relatively moderate increa-
se in the general price level, that was doubled in this decade. 
It took following 6 years, up to the 1969 for the infl ation level to double. In-
fl ation rate acceleration in 1970s resulted in the next 5 years of needed time span 
for its twofold increase in the year 1974. Next doubling of the general price level 
happened in 1978 and the following one in 1982. 
In 1980s infl ation was gaining a new swing. It took 2 years for the doubling 
of 1982 price level in 1984 and just 1 year for further twofold increase in 1985. 
After that, in the second half of 1980s, infl ation starts to get out of control, 
because the price level was doubled within the 1987 and rose three times, in 1988. 
In 1989 there was seven times price level increase. 
In the fi rst half of 1990s up to year 1993, price level was jumping from 10 up 
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In the second half of 1990s stabilization program was introduced resulting 
in rapid disinfl ation, price and exchange rate stabilization accompanied by zero or 
low infl ation rate. 
The easiest way, as we could see, to trace behavior of certain variables is 
through their relative changes (rate changes and changes in the rate changes).
The most stable secular alternation was shown by average annual population 
growth rate of 2.4‰ in the second half of the 20th century. Decreasing long run ra-
tes were 7 and 8‰ in 1950s, 6 ‰ in 1960s, between 4 and 5 in 1970s, around 3‰ 
at the beginning and 1‰ at the end of 1980s. Very intriguing rates of population 
changes were recorded through 1990-ties, with annual oscillations from almost 
minus 4‰ to close to 2‰ positive change ending with very concerning negative 
population growth rate in the second part of 1990s after the Homeland War.
These types of fl uctuations were virtually unknown in demography statistics 
and were probably the combined result of signifi cant immigration and emigration 
fl ows caused by war. Some of the fl uctuations could be explained by the popula-
tion census methodology changes to the lesser extent. 
Observed population changes stability in combination with the above men-
tioned relatively stabile average annual GDP volume growth rate of 3.38% and 
GDP per capita average annual growth rate of 3.13% had noticeable impact on 
employment and productivity. Beside relatively high long run annual average em-
ployment rate of nearly 2%, this period was memorized by the accompanying 
average annual labor productivity growth rate of 1.43% (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4
GDP AND GDP PER PERSON EMPLOYED 1952-2000
Source: Družić, I. (2005) “A Journey Through Transition Time – With Special Reference to 
Croatia” Political Culture, Zagreb pp. 285-296.
High oscillations of nearly all macroeconomic variables of Croatian economy 
during second half of the 20th century were showing non homogenous develop-
ment trends, which calls for a need of more detailed analysis of certain periods.
 
2.2. Periodisation issue
Therefore, more attentive inspection of the key variables behavior in this 
era would direct to the roots of unstable events and unfavorable conditions of 
the 1980s hidden in this very period of time. Besides, this was a period whose 
performances has been controversially and sometimes even adversely rated in 
marking the causes of success and the consequences of failure within certain years 
or shorter time periods. 
Here the sensitive problem of the base year or base period starts to surface. 
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takes 1952 as the base year. It has been justifi ed by the fact that better quality 
statistics data from the year 1953, when the price reform and multiple currency 
devaluation had occurred. Therefore, earlier data have been based more or less 
on expert estimates. Still it has remained intriguing why exactly 1952 has been 
chosen, when the Croatian economy experienced 20% negative growth rate. It is 
especially interesting because in the previous 1951 year there has been 10% posi-
tive and in the 1950 there was 10% negative growth rate (Crkvenac 1984. 25).
Additional confusion in the estimates of growth performance would have 
been probably instilled by introducing 1955 as the base year. According to our 
estimates, the 1955 year has been real threshold when the prewar (1939) GDP 
level was in fact attained. If 1955 would be taken as a base year that has been 
close to the 1939 pre-war level, more realistic approach to the growth performan-
ce could be achieved. In that manner it could probably be established that GDP 
increase between 1952 and 1980 hadn’t been 6 times, but probably 4 to 5 times 
multiplied.
“Mixing” the base years and “choosing” suitable/unsuitable time periods can 
in certain cases serve as a artifi cial empirical support to prove not so founded 
theories or doctrinaire models.
In these circumstances, it is reasonable to take advantage of the periodization 
customary to the economic policy modeling of that time and that would mean 
to lean on fi ve year plans/periods that have dominated economic discussion and 
analysis. This approach could be disputable of course, but it describes planning 
economy business cycles more realisticly than the other known attempts to delve 
into the economic mechanism of the socialist economy. Therefore we will stick to 
fi ve year time frames. 
2.2.1. “Climbing up” to the Growth Path
The fi rst offi cially introduced was the plan for the period 1947-51. The very 
well known fact is that there are no suitable statistical data, for the period from 
1945 to 1952 on disposal for a quality analysis, besides estimated growth rates of 
industrial and agricultural production and traffi c. It should be also observed that 
available data for industrial production and traffi c resulted from very modest real 
progress, although there could have been impression of high growth due to the 
extremely low base in 1946. Agricultural production is probably characterized by 
imprecise evaluation based on incomplete data of mandatory purchase of agricul-
tural products, in that period of time conducted by the government
This is also the period severely infl uenced by the impact of non economic 
factors on the scope and the range of economic activity. First of all, there was a 
I. DRUŽIĆ: Progress and Regress Symetry of the Croatian Economy
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 58 (3-4) 131-157 (2007)144
matter of two big droughts, in 1950 and 1952, that decimated agricultural produc-
tion. In the situation when agricultural production dominated over the economy 
structure, the country was literally brought to the verge of hunger. Other factor 
was the economic and political break up with the U.S.S.R. in 1948, which resulted 
in an economic blockade of former Yugoslavia by the Soviet bloc countries and 
absence of the Soviet help in the realization of the fi rst fi ve-year plan of an acce-
lerated industrialization 1947-1951. Although it could be noticed that this was not 
homogenous period, because high positive yearly growth rates were achieved in 
particular years (such as 1948, 1949 and 1951) in combination with  high negative 
growth rates (such as 1950), it could probably be assessed that in this period an 
average yearly growth rate was around 2 – 2,5%.
Second fi ve year period 1952-56 was not enveloped in its fi ve own fi ve year 
plan. Due to special occasions and occurred reforms it was formally time of pro-
longed fi rst fi ve year plan. Introduction of self-management in 1950 and gradual 
opening toward the West in 1953/54 led to fi rst economic reforms. In that manner, 
1953 price reform accompanied with a high devaluation, signifi cantly changed 
not just the price level but the relative prices as well. Those circumstances had an 
impact on the fact that relatively reliable time series could be constructed just for 
the period after the year 1952, since those relevant statistical publications started 
to appear at that time. For all that, some relevant structural indicators, such as the 
composition of foreign trade, could be monitored only since the end of 1950s. 
However, if we compressed the fi rst half of 1950s (when the fi rst fi ve-year plan 
was practically being prolonged by subsequent annual plans) in a fi ve-year time, 
then we would actually have a second fi ve-year period 1952-56, following the 
fi rst fi ve-year plan. In that period an average annual GDP growth rate could be 
estimated at 3.6%. This period of big political changes and impressive system re-
forms had a large impact on the stability of business activity. Due to this occurren-
ces perceptible oscillation in growth rates, from negative rates in two to positive 
growth rates in the other three years of this period could be noticed. 
2.2.2. Flying (growth) colours
The goals of second offi cial fi ve-year plan 1957-1961 was proclaimed as 
fulfi lled in 4 years. Therefore it is generally held as the most successful fi ve-year 
period and practically seen as the only fi ve-year plan which was fulfi lled and, 
for that matter, ahead of schedule. The growth rate was differently estimated and 
thus could be stated, with a certain level of reliability, that it amounted to slightly 
over 10%. Especially evident was the improvement in living standards of citizens 
and employees. That was the consequence of the economic policy redesign and 
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restructuring. The policy objectives prioritizing  heavy industry’s capacities were 
changed into a model of more balanced development opening up the space to 
consumer industry growth, as well as to more signifi cant market opening. Among 
professionals the consent was generally reached in validating this short period as 
a overall success. However it was also a time and a space of fi rst dissent in the 
“paradise”. Interesting and open discussions started, and serious doctrinaire issues 
were arisen culminating during the following fi ve-year plan. 
The third fi ve-year plan 1961-1965 was based on the extrapolation of high 
growth rates from the former period (Horvat, 2001a:81). It was predicted that 
the “natural” growth rate would be 11%. But, actual events assumed radically 
different shape. The very next (1962) planning year, instead of high growth rates, 
stagnation appeared, economic and political disputes surfaced; fi rst reforms were 
initiated, and on the top of this plan was formally abandoned. However, it beco-
mes necessary to point out that somewhat heated discussions of that time obscured 
the more objective real events evaluation. If the obtained average growth rate of 
6.7% is put into a historical perspective it could be judged as no small accom-
plishment. But, since the programmed growth rate exceeded 10%, and initial year 
results were unfavorable, it was reason enough for a negative evaluation of that 
plan period. 
Plan proponents and creators tried to reduce their own responsibility for the 
development policy failure to the attempt of proving that it was the case of a 
standard investment cycle of a planned economy. According to them fl uctuations 
were additionally stimulated by the insuffi cient wage policy because self managed 
fi rms were favoring high wages policy at the savings/investments expense. It was 
even tried to prove that binding wage increase to labor productivity growth was 
not a good policy. Namely, as labor productivity was linked to the technology/ca-
pital and technology intensity there was no reason for wages in the oil industry, 
for instance, to be higher than the ones in the textile industry. Besides, high wages 
demonstration effect initiates other sectors to increase their own wages causing 
infl ation, instability and investments fall down (Čobeljić, 1967:219-220). 
On the other hand there were claims seriously doubting profi ciency and 
skills of professional planers, that delivered the 1961-65 plan. Inferences drew 
employing limited insight into global indicators, such as national income and 
investments, neglecting at the same time disrupted macroeconomic equilibrium 
stemming from structural aberrations and balance of payments disorder. An addi-
tional problem was that such a superfi cial analysis served as a basis for the cur-
rent economic policy conduct in the 1961-65 period leading to infl ation pressure, 
market disequilibrium and stagnation (Sirotković, 1966:189). 
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2.2.3. “Great” debate
Cumulated development problems were initiating number of theoretical que-
stions occurrence as well as stimulating certain empirical dilemmas appearance. 
These events commonly known as the “Great debate” are of signifi cant impor-
tance, because doctrinaire positions assumed by various groups of professional 
economists outlived all economic reforms, political and social changes, including 
the collapse of former Yugoslavia. In a different confi guration main development 
and growth issues even survived throughout most of the transition period. 
The professionals in charge of planning methodology in the specifi ed pe-
riod tried to redeem themselves by self-proclaimed theory of investment cycles 
discovery. Further more “natural” course of the investment cycle recession was 
additionally worsened by the defective short term economic policy model. The 
responsibility for the plans’ failure in fact tried to divert to the refusal of proposed 
political reforms (Horvat, 2001b:119). 
Opponents among professionals adopted radically different opinion asser-
ting that poor and insuffi cient 1961-65 plan methodology leaning almost exclusi-
vely on extremely simplifi ed models of trend extrapolation were the cause of plan 
failure (Sirotković, 1992:119). 
Later on, the debate was increasingly politicized, for it was placed in the 
nationalistic dissent context especially serving the “Greater Serbia” ideology with 
other nationalisms close behind. Some of Serbian professional economists and 
intellectuals, members of Serbian Academy of Science in their infamous 1980s 
“Memorandum…” were among other things blaming the 1960s as “fatal turno-
ver”, when abandoning the plan of 1961-65 placed emphasis on the production 
of raw materials and energy, therefore neglecting labor force employment. That 
led Serbia and the other less developed regions into unequal position. The entire 
situation was further exacerbated by the market opening of the economy (Isaković 
et al. 1986).
Politically charged doctrinaire debates can be of great importance in attempts 
to fathom the real economic growth and fl uctuations origin. Still, that kind of de-
bate is severely constrained by the biased approach to the presentation of econo-
mic facts and the lack of objectivity in the interpretation of development events.
In any case, occurrences in this period were by no means homogenous. More 
detailed insight into certain economic policy periods materialized in fi ve year 
plans, as well as the achieved results, do not yield enough arguments to support 
the claim of a “golden era” which allegedly lasted from 1952 to 1965, primarily 
due to the pronounced oscillations and divergent trends within selected time seg-
ments (Horvat, 2001a). 
The time of the fourth fi ve-year plan of the years 1966-70 was also known 
as a period of Great economic reform and renewed efforts to instilling market 
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activities into economy that was under the dominant control of the government 
and its institutions. Market restructuring and technological modernization attemp-
ts were combined with signifi cant international opening and labor market libera-
lization. Labor market liberalization had strong migration impact especially on 
Croatia and had a leading role in establishing a special nearly half a million strong 
emigration category of “quest workers”, “temporarily” employed throughout We-
stern Europe, mainly Germany. This period experienced further economic growth 
slowdown. However, time distance enables a more objective assessment as well. 
Although the growth rate was below planned expectations, it was still close to 
6% annually or more accurately average annual growth rate was 5.9%. Especially 
convincing sounds the fact that the growth was achieved along with considerable 
effort to stabilize the economy. Infl ation rate of almost 23% in 1966 was reduced 
to 6-8% within the next 3 years, and 12% in the last year of this specifi c period, 
that yields one of the lowest average annual infl ation rates of approximately 10%. 
The fourth macroeconomic variable, defi ned as the export to import ratio, also 
showed relatively satisfying trends varying around 80% average. 
Described real economy performance should be kept in mind when analy-
zing the vehement economic discussions regarding the causes and consequences 
of the Great reform that took place during the second half of the 60s and was 
offi cially proclaimed a failure. 
One view held that the reform failed, because, on the one hand the economy 
was exposed to sudden liberalization supported by a restrictive monetary policy. 
That stabilized the prices, but also brought down the growth rate. On the other 
hand, leaving income distribution between consumption and savings to the com-
panies and employees free choice decision, initiated wage increase at the invest-
ments expense that in turn curtailed growth rate (Horvat, 2001b:119-120). 
As the employment growth rate was only 1%, the opposing view held that 
lower than planned, but still respectably high growth rates, were mostly the result 
of quality factors like labor productivity and capital effi ciency growth. The reform 
demise was closely associated with its unfi nished quality. Contrary to the previou-
sly mentioned opinion it was strongly stated here that the main reform failure rea-
son was too slow liberalization and too little market freedom allowed to the (self 
managing) companies and other business entities (Sirotković, 1989:14). 
It seems that the empirical fi ndings were favoring more the views claiming 
that reform hardships originated from its incompleteness than the views linking 
not-so-insignifi cant economic reform problems with the overly fast market libera-
lization and insuffi cient government control over income distribution.
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2.2.4. Instability instilled
The 1971-75 plan was also the time of tumultuous political and social events 
so strong that economic processes were forced to take back burner. 
On a fi rst glance 5,2% average annual growth attained in this fi ve year span 
could be judged as suffi cient. Still, more detailed analysis of each year separately 
was pointing to the high instability. Growth rates were fl uctuating in a manner 
that high growth rates of 8,11% in 1971 and 8,74% in 1974 were combined by 
low growth rates of 2,76% in 1972 and 2,91% in 1975. Market disequilibrium 
magnitude, or to be more precise, absence of proper market criteria in business 
activity conduct was confi rmed by employment data. In that period employment 
growth rate was disassociated with the GDP growth rate. The economy experien-
ced the highest employment growth rates of 4,39% in 1972 and 5,18% in 1975 
exactly the years marked by lowest GDP growth rates, with direct impact on labor 
productivity fall down of 1,5% and 2,15% respectively. Maintaining the relatively 
high growth rates in the environment of worsening effi ciency and loosing compe-
titiveness had resulted in continually growing infl ation from 17% in the fi rst, to 
25% in the last year of the planning period. Instability and falling competitiveness 
were especially mirrored in decreasing export to import ratio from 81% in 1972 
to 55% in 1975.
This was also the period of high political instability in the beginning years 
and the democratic action suppression like student revolts in 1968. Even harsher 
regime reaction was imposed on “Croatian Spring” attempts to reform Yugoslav 
federation in 1971 and on Serbian leadership “Liberalization” intentions. Yet all 
these oppressively interrupted processes infl uenced that time Yugoslav authorities 
behavior to surprisingly large extent, that was confi rmed in the Constitutional 
reform of 1974.
The reform impact had a peculiar outcome in the economy. Instead of stan-
dard market reform package the accent was on self management stressing the 
legal enterprises’ right to conduct business activity on their own accord with mi-
nimal government interference and to freely distribute their revenues. However, 
enterprises, companies etc. were not free to sell assets or equities but were legally 
enabled to replace old or acquire new equipment or assets.
Political system reforms were concentrated on Constitutional reform secu-
ring the full equality of all republics and autonomous provinces in federal bo-
dies. New Constitution precisely recognized authentic sovereignty of republics 
and their voluntarily association in Yugoslav Federation, implicitly including the 
secession right. That was legal ground for the later Declaration of Independency 
proclaimed by Croatia and other republics of former Yugoslavia in 1990s.
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Still, the Constitution reforms were of limited scope. Instead human rights 
promotion, full democracy and political pluralism allowed, the so called delega-
ted system founded on “pluralism of selfmanaging interests” was inaugurated. In 
reality it was shown to be nothing more than the political façade for the elongated 
one party rule.
The 1976-80 plan was known as attempt to achieve “intensive” growth in 
the face of the ragging oil crisis and changing technological framework of modern 
economies. Microelectronic and its application in computer sciences and telecom-
munication was paralleled with Microbiology and its application in genetics, food 
processing industry and pharmaceuticals. Unfortunately Croatia continued to fol-
low the old path of speeded up industrialization heavily investing in aluminum 
combines, oil refi neries, and chemical industry with addition of road network con-
struction.
However, high investment rate resulted in high growth rates and attained 
average growth rate of 5,6% which was among the highest in the previous century. 
This was one of the most successful periods employment wise. Employment rate 
was 4,4% on average and labor productivity was growing by the rate of 1,2%. 
High investment rate, on the other hand produced heavy external borrowing and 
the beginning of relatively high indebtness of the Croatian economy. These trends 
were accompanied with expanding infl ation. Infl ation jumped to over 20% annual 
rate towards the end of 70s.
At the economy analytical evaluations level there was continuous dissenting 
debate going on concerning the scope and direction of economic activity. 
In the one camp there were simplifying notions with no real data support that 
the market was introduced where it was not supposed to exist (intra-company or 
between different parts/factories within the same company) and that there was no 
market where it was supposed to be (between different business entities). There-
fore market relations were substituted with “self managing settlements and social 
contracts” deserving the economy nick name “(pre)arranged economy”. (Horvat, 
2001b: 123).
In the other camp voices were rising claiming that good enough GDP growth 
rates need to be confronted with slowed down wage increase accompanied by 
investments eruption construction industry overheated growth and speeded up 
foreign indebtness. That means that investments increase decisions were made 
at the expense of wages and living standards outside the economy and business 
community in political/government bodies. Hence, the selfmanagement is not to 
be blamed for the existing and emerging problems (Sirotković, 1989:15).
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2.2.5. Downhill Path of the 1980s
In general recession of the 80s two time lags should be distinct. From today’s 
perspective it is clearly obvious that in the fi rst lag (fi rst half of period) there was 
evident tremendous effort and high expectations that economic problems could 
be solved by programmed reforms. In second time lag piling up of noneconomic 
constraints strongly infl uenced self confi dence loosing ground, general apathy and 
progressive vanquish of economic chaos and fi nal system collapse. 
In the fi rst half of this period encompassing plan from 1981-85 identifi able 
trends of slowing down business activity, growth rate fl uctuating around 0 to-
gether with balance of payments improvements and infl ation gradually getting 
into full swing, could be clearly observed. This was also a period of intensive 
stabilization program working out and its implementation trying out. There was 
even attempt of installing so called permanent revalorization of the assets trying 
to curb down spending of fi ctive/virtual income that was “pumped up” by the high 
infl ation (Hanžeković, 1987:300).  Reform attempts were especially focused on 
capital market constitution and balance of payments stabilization. 
In second leg of this period from i.e. plan from 1986 to 89/90 enough elemen-
ts of economic and overall crash down could have been discerned. Growth rates 
between -0,5-1% were increasingly negative and hyperinfl ation was getting out of 
control. One of the explanation was that the infl ation cause and the consequence 
was “liquidity paradox” in the balance sheets of the fi rms allowing the simulta-
neous existence of the fi nancial surpluses and defi cits (Ribnikar, 1989: 192).
At the end of 80s major contribution to the economic system decay and 
hyperinfl ation over 1000% annually, was administered by so called “breaking and 
entering” the monetary system. Simply it was the illegal money printing activity 
performed in the National Bank of Yugoslavia under the auspices of Serbian au-
thorities without the knowledge and/or consent of other republics of former Yu-
goslavia. “Self defending” mechanism adopted by the other republics consisted of 
overdue nominal payments into federal budget, avoidance of mandatory foreign 
currency depositing to the National Bank of Yugoslavia accounts etc.
2.3. Transition performance of the 1990s
In the period between 1990 and 2000 the average annual growth rate was 
negative and stood at about -1%. 
Particularly disturbing is negative population growth rate, that after slowed 
down growth during the whole century, registered negative average annual growth 
rate of approximately -1%. 
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This decade was also marked by negative average annual employment 
growth rate of -2.76%. Employment rate behavior was radically atypical for the 
economy that spent more than half of the period in war environment. As a rule war 
economy is conditioned by full employment of its resources especially of labor 
force. Even more, armed forces conscription of able bodied men required retirees, 
women and other groups already out of active labor force to re-enter the labor 
market. It seems that the Croatian war economy unemployment was very rare if 
not unique experience. 
Although, infl ation was curbed by implementation of the stabilization pro-
gram in the second part of 90s, infl ation rate at the beginning of 90s was so high 
that average annual infl ation rate for the whole decade amounted to 93%.
Export to import ratio was steadily decreasing with average annual value 
round about 50%. At the same time foreign debt was tripled. 
Inherited problems of the 80s clearly visible in stagnation and recession by 
all means infl uenced the performance of the Croatian economy of the 90s. That 
impact was augmented by disappearance of signifi cant export markets of former 
Yugoslavia and former Soviet bloc in the 90s. Tremendous human and physical 
capital losses defi nitely should be included in the objective analysis. These num-
bered and other unnumbered considerations were prescribing great cautiousness 
when judging Croatian economy performance. 
Highly unfavorable macroeconomic trends were concentrated in the 1991-
1995 period that was dominated by Homeland war major operations. 
Negative annual average growth rate in this period was exceeding -6% 
War economy employment, had been also decreasing at the somewhat lower 
annual rates without reasonable theoretical explanation. 
Registered average annual infl ation rate climbed over 500% annually. 
In these circumstances external trade relations could have been graded as 
relatively auspicious. Import to export ratio had sustained average 90%level. 
Yet, it should be taken into account that Croatia was practically under “unan-
nounced” international trade sanctions that were artifi cially decreasing import. 
Moreover, resource allocation focus on war machine winning efforts has dimi-
nished peacetime goods and services import capacity. As the military equipment 
procurement data were not part of offi cial national statistic publications that had 
additionally curtailed “visible” imports data. 
The second phase, took place from 1996 to 2000 when signifi cantly different 
trends could be observed. The growth rates show notable recovery. With excep-
tion of 1999 all other years annotated positive GDP trends, so the average annual 
growth rate has been around 3.5% (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5
GDP AND GDP PER CAPITA IN CROATIA 1990-2000
Source: Družić, I. (2005) “A Journey Through Transition Time – With Special Reference to 
Croatia” Political Culture, Zagreb pp. 285-296.
The most substantial positive shift was evident in monetary consolidation of 
the economy. The effects of the stabilization program were noted fi rst through di-
sinfl ation. In a short time span Croatia had undergone metamorphosis from hype-
rinfl ationary to low infl ation economy. The infl ation rate, in 1994, came almost 
instantly at zero point, and during this period (1996-2000), was annually around 
5% (see Figure 6.).
The success of anti-infl ation program has its source primarily in the “hard 
budget constraints” policy that has limited and reduced budget expenditure.
The reduction of fi scal and para fi scal expenditure has been achieved by re-
forming education, health insurance and pension system, by restructuring defense 
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Figure 6
ANNUAL INFLATION RATE AND LIVING COSTS 1990-2000
Source: Družić, I. (2005) “A Journey Through Transition Time – With Special Reference to 
Croatia” Political Culture, Zagreb pp. 285-296.
At the same time, fi scal revenues were restructured by reforms of fi scal sy-
stem dominated by VAT introduction as the major “jewel in the fi scal crown” 
Positive reform trends in this period should be confronted with employment 
and foreign trade indicators as the remaining macro variables.
Employment/unemployment negative trends continued to be persistently un-
favorable in the second half of 90s. The average annual employment rate remai-
ned negative at the – 0.65%. Although the situation is possible when decreasing 
number of employed has been not automatically followed by increased number of 
unemployed, because some lay off employees might leave the active job search 
for good that was not case here. 
Croatian experience has been simultaneous decrease of employment and in-
crease of unemployment. 
The complexity of the problem of employment /unemployment was empha-
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nally notable relevant GDP growth rates, employment and unemployment showed 
to be negative, should be put in context of change in GDP composition. Nonfi nan-
cial/real sector share, which generates more labor demand has been permanently 
decreasing, while fi nancial sector share, which in Croatian case generates lower 
labor demand had been constantly increasing in GDP composition. 
The other unusual occurrence employment wise had been that mass layoffs 
in the fi rst part of 90s were not materialized in proper increased labor productivity 
in the following period (see Figure 7).
Figure 7
GDP AND GDP PER PERSON EMPLOYED IN CROATIA 1990-2000
Source: Družić, I. (2005) “A Journey Through Transition Time – With Special Reference to 
Croatia” Political Culture, Zagreb pp. 285-296.
Export to import ratio drop in the second part of 90s had additionally affected 
employment indicators. Fall down of export to import ratio to an average of ap-
proximately 50% in this period excluded the possibility of employment rise by 
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Figure 8
EXPORT/IMPORT RATIO IN CROATIA 1990-2000
Source: Družić, I. (2005) “A Journey Through Transition Time – With Special Reference to 
Croatia” Political Culture, Zagreb pp. 285-296.
There has been no doubt that the overall fundamental reforms objective was 
exactly the break up with the unacceptable practice of the pre-transition period. At 
the same time deep structural changes have been expected to emancipate creative 
potentials swollen by national liberation and attainment of sovereign independent 
state. However, considering marked highly unfavorable conditions and some afo-
rementioned accommodating ones, it could be stated that the Croatian economy 
performance has been not only below expectations but was well below attainable 
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SIMETRIJA NAPREDOVANJA I NAZADOVANJA HRVATSKE EKONOMIJE
Sažetak
Uopćeno govoreći hrvatski gospodarski razvitak tijekom 20. stoljeća može se ocijeni-
ti turbulentnim, osobito u poredbi s razvijenim ekonomijama. Suvremene visoko razvijene 
zemlje postigle su višestruko uvećanje nacionalnog proizvoda tijekom proteklog stoljeća. 
Njima nasuprot, ostatak svijeta kojeg nastanjuje dominantna većina ukupnog svjetskog 
pučanstva i kojemu pripada pretežiti dio zemalja, još uvijek vodi neizvjesnu bitku na kri-
vudavoj uzbrdici ekonomskog razvoja obilježenog brojnim stranputicama i slijepim uli-
cama. Kada se u nekoj od ovih zemalja i otvori razdoblje rasta, njega vrlo brzo naslijedi 
stagnacija i/ili svekoliki regres s dugoročno nepovoljnim razvojnim performansama. Izra-
vna je posljedica takvih gibanja tijekom proteklog stoljeća, širenje razvojnog jaza između 
ogromne većine svjetskog pučanstva i manjine “sretnika” koji žive u razvijenim gospo-
darstvima. U tom je kontekstu hrvatsko ekonomsko iskustvo ne samo intrigantno nego  i 
analitički vrlo upečatljivo.  
Ključne riječi: ekonomski napredak, ekonomsko nazadovanje, rast, zaposlenost, in-
fl acija, odnos izvoz/uvoz, fl uktuacije, tranzicija, privatizacija, stabilizacija.
